Near-infrared light spectroscopy and stimulation in cognitive neuroscience: the need for an integrative view?

Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) has been largely used in neuroscience as an alternative non-invasive neuroimaging technique, primarily to measure the oxygenation levels of cerebral haemoglobin. Its portability and relative robustness against motion artefacts made it an ideal method to measure cerebral blood changes during physical activity. Usually referred to as 'functional' NIRS (fNIRS) when used to monitor brain changes during motor or cognitive tasks, this technique often involves the montage the probes on the forehead of the participants to gauge the neurophysiological underpinning of executive functioning. Other applications of NIRS include other aspects of cerebral hemodynamics such as cerebral pulsatility. However, there is an important aspect that fNIRS studies do not seem to have taken into account so far, which relates to the capacity of near-infrared light to modulate cognitive and psychological processes according to what is known as photobiomodulation (PBM). Hence, drawing on a selection of NIRS and PBM experiments, we argue in favour of an integrative view for NIR-based neuroimaging studies, which should embrace a control for the possible effects of light stimulation, especially when fNIRS is considered to test the effect of an intervention.

Enhancing Psychosis Risk Prediction Through Computational Cognitive Neuroscience.

Research suggests that early identification and intervention with individuals at clinical high risk (CHR) for psychosis may be able to improve the course of illness. The first generation of studies suggested that the identification of CHR through the use of specialized interviews evaluating attenuated psychosis symptoms is a promising strategy for exploring mechanisms associated with illness progression, etiology, and identifying new treatment targets. The next generation of research on psychosis risk must address two major limitations: (1) interview methods have limited specificity, as recent estimates indicate that only 15%-30% of individuals identified as CHR convert to psychosis and (2) the expertise needed to make CHR diagnosis is only accessible in a handful of academic centers. Here, we introduce a new approach to CHR assessment that has the potential to increase accessibility and positive predictive value. Recent advances in clinical and computational cognitive neuroscience have generated new behavioral measures that assay the cognitive mechanisms and neural systems that underlie the positive, negative, and disorganization symptoms that are characteristic of psychotic disorders. We hypothesize that measures tied to symptom generation will lead to enhanced sensitivity and specificity relative to interview methods and the cognitive intermediate phenotype measures that have been studied to date that are typically indicators of trait vulnerability and, therefore, have a high false positive rate for conversion to psychosis. These new behavioral measures have the potential to be implemented on the internet and at minimal expense, thereby increasing accessibility of assessments.

Putting the Nonsocial Into Social Neuroscience: A Role for Domain-General Priority Maps During Social Interactions.

Whether on a first date or during a team briefing at work, people's daily lives are inundated with social information, and in recent years, researchers have begun studying the neural mechanisms that support social-information processing. We argue that the focus of social neuroscience research to date has been skewed toward specialized processes at the expense of general processing mechanisms with a consequence that unrealistic expectations have been set for what specialized processes alone can achieve. We propose that for social neuroscience to develop into a more mature research program, it needs to embrace hybrid models that integrate specialized person representations with domain-general solutions, such as prioritization and selection, which operate across all classes of information (both social and nonsocial). To illustrate our central arguments, we first describe and then evaluate a hybrid model of information processing during social interactions that (a) generates novel and falsifiable predictions compared with existing models; (b) is predicated on a wealth of neurobiological evidence spanning many decades, methods, and species; (c) requires a superior standard of evidence to substantiate domain-specific mechanisms of social behavior; and (d) transforms expectations of what types of neural mechanisms may contribute to social-information processing in both typical and atypical populations.

Bioacoustics in cognitive research: Applications, considerations, and recommendations.

The multifaceted ability to produce, transmit, receive, and respond to acoustic signals is widespread in animals and forms the basis of the interdisciplinary science of bioacoustics. Bioacoustics research methods, including sound recording and playback experiments, are applicable in cognitive research that centers around the processing of information from the acoustic environment. We provide an overview of bioacoustics techniques in the context of cognitive studies and make the case for the importance of bioacoustics in the study of cognition by outlining some of the major cognitive processes in which acoustic signals are involved. We also describe key considerations associated with the recording of sound and its use in cognitive applications. Based on these considerations, we provide a set of recommendations for best practices in the recording and use of acoustic signals in cognitive studies. Our aim is to demonstrate that acoustic recordings and stimuli are valuable tools for cognitive researchers when used appropriately. In doing so, we hope to stimulate opportunities for innovative cognitive research that incorporates robust recording protocols. This article is categorized under: Neuroscience > Cognition Psychology > Theory and Methods Neuroscience > Behavior Neuroscience > Cognition.

Naturalistic stimuli reveal a dominant role for agentic action in visual representation.

Naturalistic, dynamic movies evoke strong, consistent, and information-rich patterns of activity over a broad expanse of cortex and engage multiple perceptual and cognitive systems in parallel. The use of naturalistic stimuli enables functional brain imaging research to explore cognitive domains that are poorly sampled in highly-controlled experiments. These domains include perception and understanding of agentic action, which plays a larger role in visual representation than was appreciated from experiments using static, controlled stimuli.

The quandary of covarying: A brief review and empirical examination of covariate use in structural neuroimaging studies on psychological variables.

Although covarying for potential confounds or nuisance variables is common in psychological research, relatively little is known about how the inclusion of covariates may influence the relations between psychological variables and indices of brain structure. In Part 1 of the current study, we conducted a descriptive review of relevant articles from the past two years of NeuroImage in order to identify the most commonly used covariates in work of this nature. Age, sex, and intracranial volume were found to be the most commonly used covariates, although the number of covariates used ranged from 0 to 14, with 37 different covariate sets across the 68 models tested. In Part 2, we used data from the Human Connectome Project to investigate the degree to which the addition of common covariates altered the relations between individual difference variables (i.e., personality traits, psychopathology, cognitive tasks) and regional gray matter volume (GMV), as well as the statistical significance of values associated with these effect sizes. Using traditional and random sampling approaches, our results varied widely, such that some covariate sets influenced the relations between the individual difference variables and GMV very little, while the addition of other covariate sets resulted in a substantially different pattern of results compared to models with no covariates. In sum, these results suggest that the use of covariates should be critically examined and discussed as part of the conversation on replicability in structural neuroimaging. We conclude by recommending that researchers pre-register their analytic strategy and present information on how relations differ based on the inclusion of covariates.

A systematic review and meta-analysis of the evidence for unaware fear conditioning.

Whether fear conditioning can take place without contingency awareness is a topic of continuing debate and conflicting findings have been reported in the literature. This systematic review provides a critical assessment of the available evidence. Specifically, a search was conducted to identify articles reporting fear conditioning studies in which the contingency between conditioned stimuli (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US) was masked, and in which CS-US contingency awareness was assessed. A systematic assessment of the methodological quality of the included studies (k = 41) indicated that most studies suffered from methodological limitations (i.e., poor masking procedures, poor awareness measures, researcher degrees of freedom, and trial-order effects), and that higher quality predicted lower odds of studies concluding in favor of contingency unaware fear conditioning. Furthermore, meta-analytic moderation analyses indicated no evidence for a specific set of conditions under which contingency unaware fear conditioning can be observed. Finally, funnel plot asymmetry and p-curve analysis indicated evidence for publication bias. We conclude that there is no convincing evidence for contingency unaware fear conditioning.

Making social neuroscience less WEIRD: Using fNIRS to measure neural signatures of persuasive influence in a Middle East participant sample.

The large majority of social neuroscience research uses WEIRD populations-participants from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic locations. This makes it difficult to claim whether neuropsychological functions are universal or culture specific. In this study, we demonstrate one approach to addressing the imbalance by using portable neuroscience equipment in a study of persuasion conducted in Jordan with an Arabic-speaking sample. Participants were shown persuasive videos on various health and safety topics while their brain activity was measured using functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Self-reported persuasiveness ratings for each video were then recorded. Consistent with previous research conducted with American subjects, this work found that activity in the dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex predicted how persuasive participants found the videos and how much they intended to engage in the messages' endorsed behaviors. Further, activity in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex was associated with persuasiveness ratings, but only in participants for whom the message was personally relevant. Implications for these results on the understanding of the brain basis of persuasion and on future directions for neuroimaging in diverse populations are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Improving precision in neuropsychological assessment: Bridging the gap between classic paper-and-pencil tests and paradigms from cognitive neuroscience.

OBJECTIVE: In cognitive neuroscience, well-controlled and highly specific paradigms have been developed to measure cognitive processes over the last decades, often using computer-assisted presentation and response registration. This approach is in contrast with the traditional paper-and-pencil tests used in clinical neuropsychology, which typically assess cognitive function in a less specific manner, often even at the level of a cognitive domain. As a result, important aspects of cognitive (dys)function may be missed during a neuropsychological assessment. This paper focuses on the main challenges that need to be overcome in order to successfully integrate experimental paradigms from cognitive neuroscience into the clinical practice of neuropsychologists. METHOD: Six challenges are discussed: (i) experimental paradigms are often lengthy and may be overly specific; (ii) technical limitations even today hamper their application in clinics; (iii) the psychometric properties of methods used in cognitive neuroscience are under-examined or poor; (iv) many paradigms from cognitive neuroscience rely on reaction times rather than accuracy, limiting their use in the many brain-injured patients with processing speed deficits; (v) the predictive and ecological validity of these paradigms often unclear; (vi) technological progress (e.g. Moore's law) seriously affects the continuous availability of experimental computerized assessment methods. CONCLUSION: Both cognitive neuroscientists and clinical neuropsychologists should work together to develop and validate novel paradigms for use in clinical assessments that are platform-independent, reliable and valid, user friendly and easy to use in clinical practice.

Title TBA: Revising the Abstract Submission Process.

Academic conferences are among the most prolific scientific activities, yet the current abstract submission and review process has serious limitations. We propose a revised process that would address these limitations, achieve some of the aims of Open Science, and stimulate discussion throughout the entire lifecycle of the scientific work.

Data quality over data quantity in computational cognitive neuroscience.

We analyzed factors that may hamper the advancement of computational cognitive neuroscience (CCN). These factors include a particular statistical mindset, which paves the way for the dominance of statistical power theory and a preoccupation with statistical replicability in the behavioral and neural sciences. Exclusive statistical concerns about sampling error occur at the cost of an inadequate representation of the problem of measurement error. We contrasted the manipulation of data quantity (sampling error, by varying the number of subjects) against the manipulation of data quality (measurement error, by varying the number of data per subject) in a simulated Bayesian model identifiability study. The results were clear-cut in showing that - across all levels of signal-to-noise ratios - varying the number of subjects was completely inconsequential, whereas the number of data per subject exerted massive effects on model identifiability. These results emphasize data quality over data quantity, and they call for the integration of statistics and measurement theory.

¿Puede explicarse la conciencia? Sobre la relación mente-cerebro. Respuesta / No disponible

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A potential role of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism in self-reported executive functioning

Intense effort is directed toward searching for associations between genes and neuropsychological measures of executive functions. In contrast, the impact of genetic polymorphisms on self-rating of everyday executive functioning has not been investigated so far. This study was designed to test associations of self-reported executive functioning, measured with the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF-A), with dopaminergic and serotoninergic genes in non-clinical population and to assess impact of neuropsychological and personality characteristics on these associations. One hundred healthy adults completed the BRIEF-A, personality inventories SPQ-74, STAI, MMPI, and neuropsychological tests for executive functions. Polymorphisms in the DRD4, COMT, DRD2, HTR2A, and SLC6A4 genes were genotyped. We revealed a significant main effect of the SLC6A4’s 5-HTTLPR polymorphism on BRIEF-A scores (F = 2.21, P = .018, η2 = .24). Among the BRIEF-A measures, the genotype effect was significant for the Plan/Organize (F = 7.34, P = .008, η2 = .07) and Task Monitor scales (F = 4.33, P = .04, η2 = .04), and the Metacognition index (F = 4.21, P = .043, η2 = .04). Carriers of the short allele reported fewer problems than homozygotes for the long allele. Correlations of the BRIEF-A measures with neuropsychological variables were weak, while those with personality characteristics were strong, with trait anxiety being the most powerful predictor of the BRIEF-A scores. However, the relationship between the 5-HTTLPR and BRIEF-A scores remained significant when trait anxiety was controlled for. The results suggest a potential role of the 5-HTTLPR in self-reported everyday task planning and monitoring (AU)

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El problema mente-cerebro (I): fundamentos ontoepistemológicos / The mind-brain problem (I): onto-epistemological foundations

Introducción. La ciencia y la filosofía han abordado a lo largo de la historia del pensamiento y desde diferentes perspectivas epistémicas el problema mente-cerebro. La primera de ellas acota áreas específicas de la realidad y construye hipótesis de corto alcance y múltiple conectividad intercientífica con el objetivo de validar modelos teóricos; la segunda extiende su arquitectura sistémica al conjunto de lo real (incluida la actividad científica). Desarrollo. La complejidad del problema mente-cerebro exige generar un vínculo de conexión disciplinar entre la filosofía y la ciencia; nuestros presupuestos ontoepistemológicos se erigen, por lo tanto, en el marco de una filosofía orientada científicamente (filosofía científica). Se defiende el materialismo emergentista como solución filosófico-científica coherente y contrastable en contraposición a otras propuestas desarrolladas desde diferentes modelos ontológicos (por ejemplo, dualismo interaccionista, funcionalismo, teoría de la identidad, epifenomenalismo...). Conclusiones. La respuesta al problema mente-cerebro sólo es factible desde una neurociencia cognitiva fundamentada filosóficamente: el materialismo emergentista -postulado ontológico- afirma que la mente es una propiedad emergente (novedad cualitativa) del cerebro; el realismo científico -postulado epistemológico- sostiene que la neurociencia cognitiva es la herramienta teórico-experimental básica que posibilita el acceso cognoscitivo tanto al cerebro como a sus procesos neurocognitivos. Consideramos que a partir de esta fundamentación filosófica, la neurociencia cognitiva adquiere legitimidad epistémica para acometer el estudio del proceso mental más genuinamente humano: la conciencia (AU)

Introduction. Throughout the history of thought, science and philosophy have addressed the problem of mind-brain from different epistemic perspectives. The first covers specific areas of reality and constructs hypotheses with limited scope and multiple inter-scientific connectivity with the aim of validating theoretical models; the second extends its systemic architecture to all that is real (including scientific activity). Development. The complexity of the mind-brain problem requires the generation of a link connecting the disciplines of philosophy and science; our onto-epistemological presuppositions therefore fall within the framework of a scientifically-oriented philosophy (scientific philosophy). Emergentist materialism is defended as a coherent and verifiable philosophical-scientific solution, as opposed to other proposals developed on the basis of different ontological models (for example, interactionist dualism, functionalism, theory of identity, epiphenomenalism, and so on). Conclusions. An answer to the mind-brain problem is only feasible if based on a philosophically grounded cognitive neuroscience: emergentist materialism -an ontological postulate- holds that the mind is an emergent property (qualitative novelty) of the brain; scientific realism -an epistemological postulate- holds that cognitive neuroscience is the basic theoretical-experimental tool that allows cognitive access to both the brain and its neurocognitive processes. We consider that on the basis of this philosophical reasoning, cognitive neuroscience acquires epistemic legitimacy to be able to undertake the study of the most genuinely human mental process: consciousness (AU)

Neurociencia cognitiva aplicada / Applied cognitive neuroscience

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Evaluación cognitiva en niños que presentaron gastrosquisis: estudio de casos y controles / Cognitive assessment in children who presented gastroschisis: a case-control study

Introducción. La gastrosquisis es una malformación de la pared abdominal que se corrige mediante cirugía y requiere cuidados hospitalarios especiales, como inmovilización, restricción alimenticia y separación de la madre durante tiempo variable, entre otros; para analizar las posibles repercusiones cognitivas se aplicó la prueba de Bayley III a 14 niños. Sujetos y métodos. Siete casos (nacidos con gastrosquisis) y siete controles, en los hospitales civiles de Guadalajara, en el período enero-abril de 2013. Resultados. Los casos no evidenciaron retraso en las evaluaciones relacionadas con la cognición, el lenguaje y la conducta motora, en tanto que en las asociadas a la conducta socioemocional y adaptativa las puntuaciones favorecieron al grupo control, lo que refleja que poseen mejores estrategias de adaptación e interacción respecto al grupo de casos. Conclusiones. La gastrosquisis no afectará el neurodesarrollo ulterior, por lo menos en este grupo que presentó esta única anormalidad y déficits explicables por sus circunstancias perinatales, sin que este pronóstico pueda generalizarse a otros casos con un cuadro clínico más grave, mayor duración de la estancia hospitalaria y comorbilidad asociada. De cualquier forma, es importante informar a los padres desde la etapa prenatal respecto a las consecuencias esperadas de esta patología (AU)

Introduction. Gastroschisis is a malformation of the abdominal wall that is corrected by surgery and requires special hospital care, such as immobilisation, dietary restriction and separation from the mother for a variable period of time, among others. To analyse the possible cognitive repercussions, the Bayley III test was administered to 14 children. Subjects and methods. The study was conducted with seven cases (born with gastroschisis) and seven controls, in civil hospitals in Guadalajara, over the period January-April 2013. Results. No evidence of retardation was found in the cases in the cognition, language and motor conduct assessments, whereas in those associated with socio-emotional and adaptive behaviour the scores favoured the control group. This shows that the latter have better adaptation and interaction strategies with respect to the cases group. Conclusions. Gastroschisis will not affect later neurodevelopment, at least in this group which presented only this abnormality and deficits that can be explained by their perinatal circumstances. Nevertheless, this prognosis cannot be generalised to other cases with a more severe clinical picture, a longer stay in hospital and associated comorbidity. In any case, it is important to inform the parents as of the prenatal stage about the expected consequences of this pathology (AU)

Is neuroimaging measuring information in the brain?

Psychology moved beyond the stimulus response mapping of behaviorism by adopting an information processing framework. This shift from behavioral to cognitive science was partly inspired by work demonstrating that the concept of information could be defined and quantified (Shannon, 1948). This transition developed further from cognitive science into cognitive neuroscience, in an attempt to measure information in the brain. In the cognitive neurosciences, however, the term information is often used without a clear definition. This paper will argue that, if the formulation proposed by Shannon is applied to modern neuroimaging, then numerous results would be interpreted differently. More specifically, we argue that much modern cognitive neuroscience implicitly focuses on the question of how we can interpret the activations we record in the brain (experimenter-as-receiver), rather than on the core question of how the rest of the brain can interpret those activations (cortex-as-receiver). A clearer focus on whether activations recorded via neuroimaging can actually act as information in the brain would not only change how findings are interpreted but should also change the direction of empirical research in cognitive neuroscience.